



265

Class

L263

Book

General Theological Seminary Library
Chelsea Square, New York

10/14/24

Purchased from the fund bequeathed to the Seminary by

EUGENE AUGUSTUS HOFFMAN, D. D.

DEAN 1879-1902

THE DOCTRINE OF INTENTION



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2026

THE DOCTRINE OF INTENTION

*Richard
Oyd*
By

R. LL. LANGFORD-JAMES, D.D.

SOMETIME SCHOLAR OF KEBLE COLLEGE, OXFORD

VICAR OF ST JAMES', EDGBASTON

Author of A Dictionary of the Eastern Orthodox Church

With an INTRODUCTORY NOTE *by the*
LORD ABBOT OF PERSHORE

LONDON
SOCIETY FOR PROMOTING
CHRISTIAN KNOWLEDGE

NEW YORK AND TORONTO : THE MACMILLAN CO.

1924

THE
LIBRARY

OF
THE
SOCIETY

FOR
PROMOTING
CHRISTIAN
KNOWLEDGE

76177

4263

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTORY NOTE, <i>by the</i> LORD ABBOT OF PERSHORE	v
PREFACE	vii
CHAPTER I: <i>Certitude</i>	i
„ II: <i>The Sure Religion</i>	9
„ III: <i>The Minister of the Sacra- ments</i>	14
„ IV: <i>The Form of the Sacraments</i>	19
„ V: <i>The Doctrine of Intention</i>	25
„ VI: <i>The No-Intention School</i>	34
„ VII: <i>The Exterior-Intention School</i>	46
„ VIII: <i>The Interior-Intention School</i>	62
„ IX: <i>Conclusion</i>	74
APPENDIX: <i>Catharinus' Treatise on Inten- tion</i>	79

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

LIBRARY

1900

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

MOST English writers treat of Intention in connection with the wider subject of Anglican Orders. Few write, or have written, of it separately and in monograph. Whether, then, *Apostolicae Curae* be dead or only in abeyance—despite Prof. Jenkins' article in a recent Number of the *Journal of Theological Studies*—Dr Langford-James' Tractate would seem to me to fill a place, and, as far as I can judge, is its own recommendation. Substantially, his conclusion is that of Leo XIII's Thomism, which, though Roman Catholic writers will demur, comes in practical effect very near to that of Catharinus, on whom Dr Langford-James draws mainly: "De mente uel intentione, utpote quae per se quiddam est interius, ecclesia non iudicat: at quatenus extra proditur, iudicare de ea debet. Iam uero cum quis ad sacramentum conficiendum et conferendum materiam formamque debitam serio ac rite adhibuit, eo ipso censetur id nimirum facere intendisse

quod facit ecclesia" (*Apostolicae Curae*). Here also there is little, if any, difference from the words of Lancelotti, which Hooker made his own: "The known intent of the Church generally doth suffice, and, where the contrary is not manifest, we may presume that he which outwardly doth the work, hath inwardly the purpose of the Church of God."

DENYS, *Abbot of Pershore*

November 20, 1923.

PREFACE

THE writer has attempted this task partly as the result of an interest he has had for some time in a subject admittedly by no means easy, partly because he is unaware of the existence of any formal treatise by an Anglican writer on the doctrine of Intention. It is this latter fact which will sufficiently explain why he has referred so constantly to Roman Catholic theologians. They have made the subject peculiarly their own. The writer hopes that his book may be found of service either in introducing the subject to Anglican readers, or else in making it clearer to those who already have some acquaintance with it. He also indulges a wider hope. The doctrine of Intention has played a conspicuous part in discussions between ourselves and the Roman Communion. The view the writer has been led to adopt, after entering on the enquiry with a perfectly free mind, is one which may be held by Roman Catholics as well. Once popular, there seem to be signs of a possibility of its return to favour, after the long predominance of other views. If that is so, then one more difficulty will have been eased. If what-

ever is written here can help in that, then the reward will be full indeed. .

The writer desires to record his indebtedness to the Librarian at Lambeth Palace for permission to transcribe the text of Catharinus, to Dr Stone, Fr Nicholson, S.J., and Fr Pourrat for guidance as to references, and to the Lord Abbot of Pershore for his kindness in reading through the manuscript and furnishing an Introduction.

CHAPTER I

CERTITUDE

THE most valuable possession that the mind of sinful man can possess is certitude. It is true that here he lives under conditions in which he "sees as in a glass darkly¹." It is true that there will be, if he wins through successfully, a contrasted condition of things in which he then sees "face to face," "knows as he is known." But the contrast cannot be drawn too sharply, in the light of constant reminders that *here and now* the heavenly conditions begin for him through his union with "Christ Who is our life²." "If thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light³."

"Probability" may be "the guide of life" in most things, but it cannot be in the most important things, especially in religion. Probability, for instance, can never be the guide of life for the lover: he demands certainty. Religion, being based upon love—and that of the highest kind—can never rest upon probability: it must have certainty. "I know (*οἶδα*)⁴ Whom I have believed⁵." "This is life eternal, that they may know (*γινώσκωσι*)⁶ Thee,

¹ 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

² Col. iii. 4.

³ Matt. vi. 22.

⁴ *οἶδα*, I know with the mind's eye.

⁵ 2 Tim. i. 12.

⁶ *γινώσκω*, I know from personal experience.

the only true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent¹." "To know (γινῶναι) Him and the power of His resurrection."

"Rational, sensible men," remarks Cardinal Newman², "as they consider themselves, men who do not comprehend the very notion of loving God above all things, are content with such a measure of probability for the truths of religion, as serves them in their secular transactions; but those who are deliberately staking their all upon the hopes of the next world, think it reasonable, and find it necessary, before starting on a new course, to have some points clear and immutable to start from; otherwise they will not start at all."

This is sheer commonsense. "O God, if there be a God, save my soul, if I have a soul" can never be the prayer of a man "convicted of sin." And no one, save the sinless, can begin to be religious unless he has begun to see himself as God sees him, namely, as a sinner. "Natural religion"—again we quote Cardinal Newman³—"is based upon the sense of sin; it recognises the disease, but it cannot find, it does not look for, the remedy. That remedy, both for guilt and for moral impotence, is found in the central doctrine of Revelation, the mediation of Christ."

But Revelation depends on *faith*. "He that cometh to God must believe that He is." "That

¹ John xvii. 3.

² *Gr. of Assent*, p. 238.

³ *Ibid.* p. 487.

believing they may have life." Faith and knowledge (*i.e.* certitude) are commonly contrasted. Is it a true contrast, any truer than St Paul's contrast between earthly and heavenly conditions we quoted above? Tennyson, the typical Victorian, may write:

Believing what we cannot prove¹.

But is that a true description of faith?

St Thomas Aquinas, a safer guide, argued that faith is more certain knowledge than any other intellectual virtue "*ex causa certitudinis quod habet certio rem causam.*" Ordinary current philosophy, spun mostly from the cobwebs of Germany or looming in the fogs of these Isles, is unwilling to recognise the philosophical possibility of certitude. On the other hand, older, more natural, more commonsense philosophies such as that of the Scholastics—so admirably brought up to date by the School of Louvain²—which were in vogue before the modern sceptical philosophies make claim, and successful claim in the mind of the writer, to provide for the deep need of certitude which the human mind demands to be satisfied.

Scholastic philosophers distinguish between various kinds of certitude, metaphysical, physical, moral. For the benefit of the reader who is not

¹ *In Memoriam.*

² Esp. by Card. Mercier in his 2 vols. *Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy.*

familiar with the Scholastic Philosophy we may, perhaps, be allowed to give a brief explanation of these kinds.

1. *Metaphysical certitude* "implies a necessity so absolute as to be bound up with the immutable nature of God Himself." So Fr Rickaby¹, a distinguished teacher of the subject. He goes on to give as illustrations "a few specimens of truths metaphysically necessary, to which the ordinary mind, unbiassed by philosophical theory" (we have drawn attention already to the Scholastic Philosophy as being "commonsense"), "will feel no difficulty in allowing a most absolute, irreversible character." "God cannot lie"; "moral right is sacred"; "nothing can at once, under the same aspect, both be and not be"; "every new reality or aspect must have a cause"; "two straight lines cannot enclose a space." Our familiar Euclid, then, comes under the aegis of metaphysical, *i.e.* absolute, certainty.

2. *Physical necessity* has to do with the order of created things, of which we observe the laws. They depend on the circumstance that God has *as a matter of fact* created the physical world as He has, though He need not have done so at all, or done it in the particular way in which as a matter of fact He has. He may will to interfere with that particular way,

¹ *First Principles*, pp. 55-56. Chs. iii-vii are quoted *passim*.

in which case we are confronted with miracle. But He does not ordinarily change the particular way: it was planned from the start and is therefore, as God is immutable and the Universe is the expression of Him, fixed and unchanged, though not unchangeable. And in any case we do not perceive the whole, as He does. So that "for us physical truths are *a posteriori*, and are ultimate facts, which we take on the evidence of experience, without being able to give their final account." All the same, we can be certain about those physical facts which we actually have made our own by observation.

3. *Moral certitude* has to do with human action. Free will forbids that we can know with the exactness with which we calculate about the immutable nature of God Himself. But practically we can. "It is a sheer impossibility that historians should be deceiving us when they narrate certain substantial events in the lives of Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, and Charlemagne. Again, there are cases where we may be certain that a very well-tried character will not prove treacherous under moderate temptation or enormous responsibility." The term "moral certitude" is also used, loosely and inaccurately, for what is not certainty at all but only high probability.

As there are kinds of certitude, so also are there degrees. "According as a thing happens to have

more truth in it," says St Thomas Aquinas¹, "it elicits a higher belief. For while truth consists of an equation between intellect and object, if we regard truth merely as an equation, it does not allow of less or more; but if we consider the very Being of the object, and remember that truth has its ground in the Being, and that such as the Being is such is the truth; then those things which have more of Being have also more of truth."

On this Fr Rickaby remarks: "that is, if you regard truth as a mere equation between a mental act and its formal object, equality is equality all the world over" [and so there *can* be no degrees in certainty: either you are sure or you are not]. But intellectual assent is no mere dead uniform sign of equality, like an algebraic symbol: it is a living response to objective evidence, and is apt to vary, *caeteris paribus*, with the evidence that calls it forth. Hence St Thomas again affirms: "an assent is nothing but the determination of the intellect to one affirmative: and by so much greater is the certitude by how much stronger is the motive by which it is determined."

This long digression has been entered into partly because without some acquaintance with the Scholastics the controversy about Intention can hardly be followed (any more than that about our own XXXIX Articles can), partly in con-

¹ *Quaest. Disput. de Caritate*, Art. ix. ad 1.

sideration of the fact that, owing to the philosophical upbringing of most of us, belief in the possibility of certitude is not an easy conception for us. In religion, of course, we easily recognise its necessity. But too often our philosophy, instead of confirming and strengthening our religion, as it should if it is a sound philosophy, tends to militate against it.

Our heart, quite likely, tells us that we should be certain: in our minds we have the murmur "probability is the guide of life." Was it not even an eminent Bishop, also, curiously enough, an eminent apologist for religion, who first taught it to us? He lived some time ago, in an unbelieving age. But we have failed sometimes to move on, as no doubt he himself would have moved on had he lived in ours.

This undue belittling of the powers of the intellect has had the result we might have expected. Bishop Creighton truly remarked, in an often quoted passage, that "An Englishman hates an idea when he sees it." He tends to, certainly, and he does so because he has been taught to distrust the capacity of his intellect for dealing with ideas with certainty as the result. Mr Chesterton has somewhere told us that it is blasphemy for a man to declare: "Of course I may be wrong." Mr Chesterton is a prophet who points by paradox to truth. If a man believed that he *could* attain to

certainly, then he would be wrong indeed not to try to attain to it. There is far too little recognition among us of the duty of making up our minds, owing, mostly, to a vague belief that we can "never be sure." It is a baneful and paralysing state of mind. The *nemesis* of it in religious matters is that, despairing of making up his mind, the average Englishman turns to the heart for certainty. So, while his heart is apt to be "in the right place," his thinking is cloudy and amateur. In the practical matters of life he will demand as much certainty as he may have, and believe he can have it. In his religion he "feels" no such certainty, and he has come to demand of feeling what he should demand of the intellect.

A witty man once remarked that the main difference between the French and ourselves is that whereas the French have three hundred sauces and one religion, we have three hundred religions and one sauce. The Frenchman trusts his intellect and is famous for his logic. But the Englishman has been sold by his pet philosophers.

CHAPTER II

THE SURE RELIGION

THE necessity of certitude is fully recognised in the whole scheme of Revelation and Redemption. God, the ultimate and only true Reality, seeks to make the lives of His creatures real, as His own life is real. The Divine Father necessarily seeks to reveal Himself as He is, in all His true reality, to His children. Infinite Wisdom, of course, recognises that the revelation must be gradual, as the children are able to receive it. He always has "many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now." But He is always working for and aiming at the state of certainty. To the world He must speak in parables: it is all they can bear. To the disciple He can speak plainly, for the disciple is spiritually receptive. And the cry of the disciple is always the glad cry of the first disciples at the end of their training by Him on earth, "Now are we sure¹." It is, note, a personal assurance, and the word used (*οἶδαμεν*) points to intellectual assurance. It is the same word that is used of Christ's knowledge, the knowledge of the infallible teacher, of which they are sure (*οἶδαμεν ὅτι οἶδας πάντα*). So St Luke, writing

¹ John xvi. 30.

his Gospel to the "most excellent Theophilus"—whether an illustrious official or simply "lover of God" and therefore illustrious—says confessedly "that thou mayest know concerning the words in which thou wert instructed their certainty¹."

The sick man will not get well unless he has a certain belief in the remedies presented to him. The sick soul will not recover unless it has a like certainty of the means of salvation.

The chief means of salvation are, of course, the Sacraments. We find, from the allusive references made to them in the New Testament, the sacramental system in full swing from the start of the Church's life. Everything about them is carefully designed to promote certainty. The uncertain, easily deceived, subjective state of feeling is directly and deliberately counteracted by means which are objective, outside the illusive play of the feelings, and in no sense dependent on them. Mere fancy is put out of court by hard fact. The man begins to be a Christian, not when he "feels like it," or thinks he feels like it, but on a distinct occasion when certain acts were done to him, at a time when he could not resist them and had no choice but to accept, as the result of promises made for him at an age when he was incapable of making them himself. The only feeling he could

¹ Luke i. 4.

experience was a feeling of sudden wetness, and probable consequent annoyance expressing itself in cries and tears unseemly in one older in the midst of such solemn surroundings. Yet now he is grown up he can be *sure* he is a Christian because of that long-ago happening to him as an infant unconscious of most of it and certainly then ignorant of its meaning.

When the Sacraments began to be theorised about, from St Augustine onwards, we find them described first as "signs." Signs of what? And to whom? Signs to the Church at large of the signal facts of Redemption; signs to the individual soul of its particular share in that Redemption. Thus St Paul describes the waters of Baptism as the sign of the Death, Burial, and Resurrection of Christ—this to His Church in general; and signs of the soul's individual share in that Death, Burial, and Resurrection by the repetition of these events in itself¹. With regard to the other chief Sacrament, the Eucharist, St Paul declares that: "as often as ye eat this bread and drink this cup ye do show the Lord's death until He come²." That is the action of the Church in general. The effect in the particular soul is that "the bread which we break, is it not the communion of the Body of Christ: the cup of blessing which we bless is it not the communion of the Blood of Christ?³" In

¹ Rom. vi. 3-5.

² 1 Cor. xi. 26.

³ *Ibid.* x. 16.

that communion each individual soul has its particular individual interest in accordance with its special individual needs.

All this demands certainty; and certainty is given. It is vital to the regenerate soul that the means of its justification shall be *sure*. Nothing is left to chance. The necessities for a valid Sacrament are from the first made clear. They are, proper matter, proper form, and a valid minister; "proper" and "valid" to secure certainty and banish doubt. In the initial Sacrament, the start of the regenerate life in Christ, both matter and form are prescribed by Christ Himself. The minister did not need defining—the Church learned afterwards that anyone might be the minister—but, as anyone might be minister, it was all the more necessary to lay down matter and form strictly. And this is just what Christ did. His Church has shown the same care with regard to matters connected with the Sacraments that have been left to her discretion. This would be inexplicable except on the ground that the Sacraments are of the very highest importance. But if the Sacraments were simply "signs" in the sense of spectacular representations, acted parables, and so on, then why this care? A crucifix would do quite as well as the "sign" of the Lord's death, showing it until He come. But the spectacular aspect of the Sacraments is not the property of all

of them, or even of the majority. Therefore it is not the most important aspect. The Sacraments are not only "signs" but they are also "efficacious signs" (*signa efficacia*), as was at once realised when men began to attempt to define them. Efficacious for what? And for whom? Efficacious for conveying grace to the individual soul. Efficacious for participation in the life of Christ, as St Paul showed clearly in the reference to the effect of the waters of Baptism. Efficacious for the gradual realisation of the final state of the Christian, "No longer I live, but Christ in me¹." Could any matter, then, be more important than the Sacraments? Could there be any matter in which certainty is more necessary for men? Obviously there could not be, and the care with which the whole sacramental system is provided for and mediated shows with abundant clearness the Church's sense of the extreme importance of certainty with regard to it.

¹ Gal. ii. 20.

CHAPTER III

THE MINISTER OF THE SACRAMENTS

THE minister of the Sacraments is, as his name implies, a servant. Our Lord Himself frequently employs the word to His Apostles, and the Apostles love to use it of themselves at the commencement of their Epistles. The minister is, as the Apostles describe themselves, the servant of Christ, the "steward" dispensing His goods, the "mysteries of Christ¹," as St Paul puts it, catching up a parable of Christ Himself. They are not his own goods that he dispenses but those of his Master. So St Chrysostom uses a natural metaphor when he declares that the minister "lends tongue and hand²" to Christ, Who is the real minister of the Sacraments. So also St Augustine³, commenting on John iv. 2, "Though He Himself did not baptize, but His disciples," says: "Himself, and not Himself; Himself in power, they in ministry; they gave Him their service (*servitutem administrant*) for baptizing, the power of baptizing remained in Christ."

Even in the matter of preaching, where individuality must necessarily come into play, the preacher is bound by the Creeds and decisions of

¹ 1 Cor. iv. 1.

² Homil. 89 in Joh.

³ In Joh. tract.

the Church: he is not quite free: he cannot teach exactly what he chooses: he remains a minister of Christ and His Church. In the administration of the Sacraments, where he is, and can be, more strictly a mere dispenser, a performer of external acts, he is still more tied down. He must use certain things, he must employ certain words; otherwise the Church cannot vouch for what he does, and the faithful cannot have that certainty about the Sacraments that we have seen they should have. He is a servant. His individuality ceases to count. His business is simply to do certain things and say certain words and that is all. In dispensing the goods of God to God's people, that is the only possible position for him. As St Augustine¹ has said, commenting on John vii. 4: "It was necessary, then, that He should baptize Who is the only Son of God, not an adopted son. The adopted sons are the ministers of the Only Son; the Only Son has the power, the adopted the ministry." St Ambrose² deals with the office of the minister thus: "How is it possible for bread to be the Body of Christ? By consecration. But in what words, what expressions (*sermonibus*) is the consecration? In those of the Lord Jesus. For all the other things which are said, are said by the priest, praise is given to God, prayer is offered for the people, for kings, for the rest; when it comes to

¹ *In Joh. tract.*

² *De Sacr.* 4. 4. 14.

16 THE MINISTER OF THE SACRAMENTS

the confection of the venerable Sacrament, then the priest does not use his own expressions but the expressions of Christ. *Therefore the word of Christ confects the Sacrament.*" Or again: "He Himself (the High Priest) is manifested making His offering among us, *Whose word sanctifies the sacrifice which is offered.*" The italics are ours and we have elaborated this point purposely in view of what is to follow in succeeding chapters. It is necessary for our enquiry to get it quite clear.

So strongly did the Church realise the office of the minister as apart from his individuality and in no way dependent on it, that, from the moment theories began to be formed about the Sacraments, she definitely ruled out the private character of the minister from her calculations about the Sacraments. It naturally took the Church a little time to decide, but not much time. It was even the occasion of a schism. Naturally God's people were shocked at the idea of a man of unworthy life handling the most sacred things: it still occasions shock and must occasion it. The necessary greatness of the shock only serves to throw into stronger relief the remembrance of the Church that, shocking as it was to the moral sense that a minister of evil life should dispense the Holy Mysteries, yet his private character *could not* affect them. He was merely an instrument; even Pontius Pilate and Herod were that in their way. St

Augustine, in the continuation of the first passage we quoted from him above, has some very striking words which give point to what we have been noticing. "His disciples were baptizing, and then Judas was still among His disciples; therefore those whom Judas baptized are not again baptized; and those whom John (Baptist) baptized were they again baptized? Clearly again, but not with iterated Baptism. For those whom John baptized, John baptized; but those whom Judas baptized, Christ baptized. So therefore those whom a drunkard, a homicide, an adulterer baptized, if the Baptism was of Christ, Christ baptized."

That, then, was the mind of the Primitive Church. Further, so conscious was the Church of the power and efficacy of the performance of the sacramental acts, that she even felt bound to recognise such cases as the Baptisms performed by St Athanasius as a boy. The story is well known, but as it looms large in Middle Age disputations on the doctrine of Intention, it may be as well to repeat it here. The young Athanasius, who was always of a serious turn of mind, was one day bathing at Alexandria with some boy companions. During their play, he performed the ceremonies of Baptism upon them. Naturally the affair aroused comment. Were these boys truly baptized? it was asked. The Bishop of Alexandria, Rufinus, decided that they were. He felt he could not risk making the conjunction of

matter and form (to use the technical terms of a later age) nugatory when effected by one competent to effect it, though in such unusual circumstances. Nothing could show more clearly the conscience of the Church, the reverence for her sacred rites, her conviction of the *mere* instrumentality of the minister, than this incident. There is a parallel story of an occurrence in modern times, during the French Revolution, when a renegade priest pronounced the words of consecration in mockery over some loaves in a baker's shop. Even here the Church held that consecration had been effected, horrible as the circumstance was. And the reason underlying both these decisions was, ultimately, the fear of imperilling the certainty of the faithful regarding the Sacraments. To preserve that, and so carry out our Lord's chief intention in instituting them, scarcely any sacrifice would be too great.

CHAPTER IV

THE FORM OF THE SACRAMENTS

WITH regard to the "matter" of the Sacraments, we need not consider it. It is not a question which affects our enquiry, which is about the doctrine of Intention. This and the preceding chapters are merely preliminary. They are intended to get certain points clear, so that we may have them sharply defined in our minds when we come to the main consideration of our problem, which is acknowledged to be a hard one. Therefore the more points we can get clear to start with the better.

If we need not consider the "matter" here we must consider the "form," for it is the form which gives determination to the matter. It is the form, pronounced, of course, by a minister who has real competence to pronounce it in the name of the Church, which makes the matter to be the "efficacious sign," the effectual channel of grace.

The form is either, as in the case of Baptism, given by our Lord Himself, or it may, as in the case of the Eucharist, usually consist of words pronounced by Him when He Himself instituted the Sacrament, or it may partly consist of such words, as in the case of Holy Orders, or of words

20 THE FORM OF THE SACRAMENTS

prescribed by the Church, as in the case of Penance.

Now have such sacred and authorised words *force in themselves*? The references we gave in the last chapter from the Fathers incline us to suspect that the Early Fathers believed that they had, or perhaps took it for granted that they had, without having gone carefully into the theology of the matter, as had not been done, of course, in the time of most of them. It is not until the time of St Augustine that we find any real tackling of the matter. But the opinion of the Early Fathers always necessarily commands a large amount of respect. Certainly the Name of "God" was held to have special force in itself in the Church of the Old Testament. Similarly the Name of "Jesus" had force. In our Lord's lifetime His disciples brought to Him the case of one who had been casting out devils in the Name of Christ, though not a professed follower of His. The casting out was evidently effective, or there would have been no point in the disciples' difficulty, and our Lord in His reply implies this ("Forbid him not, for there is no man which shall do a miracle in my name, that can lightly speak evil of me¹"). The man, that is, was recognised by our Lord as doing His work, and our Lord allowed him to go on doing it. This constituted the difference between

¹ Mk. ix. 39.

the disciples and the sons of Sceva¹, who, though they used the Name of Jesus, did so on their own responsibility, with terrifying results to themselves. They had used the Sacred Name as a mere charm. In contrast to their action and its effects is the incident of the healing of the man at the Beautiful Gate of the Temple². St Peter, commenting on this, declares that "His (Christ's) Name, through faith in His Name, hath made this man strong," and he expressly declaims against any idea that "by our own power" or holiness we had made this man to walk. This in spite of the fact that our Lord *had* commanded them to "heal the sick."

We have said that the sons of Sceva used the Holy Name as a charm. We have implied that the disciples did not, for the word has evil associations. Still, an eminent modern philosopher³ has said this about the matter: "A great deal of primitive prayer was magical in spirit, and some of its magical nature has been inherited by the prayers of even the most spiritual religions. Thus the almost universal practice of closing Christian prayers with some such formula as 'in the name of Jesus Christ,' or 'for Jesus' sake,' etc., is regarded by anthropologists as a survival of the magical custom of using the names of powerful spirits as

¹ Acts xix. 13 *seqq.*

² Acts iii.

³ Prof. Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, Ch. 15.

22 THE FORM OF THE SACRAMENTS

spells....Formal public prayers the individual learns from his elders, by imitation or direct instruction, and coming as most of them do with the authority of several generations behind them they are learned with reverence and regarded as sacred. The very form of words itself has a kind of sanctity, is peculiarly *religious*, and is naturally regarded as especially pleasing to the Deity. Hence the formal prayers finally come to be viewed as possessing a virtue of their own, and as producing some kind of good result—even if they be in a language quite unintelligible to the one who uses them. Hence the magic nature of the prayer-wheel for the Tibetan, of the Sanskrit prayer to the illiterate Hindu, of the Pali prayer to the Chinese Buddhist, and of the Latin Pater Noster to the European peasant. When the ritualistic prayer comes to be regarded as possessing power in itself, regardless of the mental state of him who says it, it ceases of course to be prayer at all, and becomes exactly a magic spell.”

We may just rapidly note, in passing, as an answer that (1) our Lord Himself commanded us to ask in His Name, and that (2) it makes all the difference whether a man outside the Church is praying a superstitious prayer like the Tibetan or the Chinese Buddhist, or is in the Church and using our Lord's own form of words. But that is not the real point. The real point to ascertain is, whether

words *in themselves* can have power. The question is a practical one for our enquiry, as there is one school which emphatically says that they can have. So, if the reader thinks all this very dry—as it is—let us assure him that we have not unnecessarily drawn him into this particular discussion. And let us refuse to be frightened by hard words, such as “magic,” “spell,” “charm” and see what they really mean. We cannot do better than quote the words of the writer on “Occult Art” in the *Catholic Encyclopaedia*. “In a restricted sense,” says this writer, “magic is understood to be an interference with the usual course of physical nature by apparently inadequate means (recitation of formularies, gestures, mixing of incongruous elements, and other mysterious actions) the knowledge of which is obtained through secret communications with the force underlying the Universe (God, the Devil, the soul of the world, etc.); it is the attempt to work miracles not by the power of God, gratuitously communicated to man, but the use of hidden forces beyond man’s control.... The Catholic Church admits in principle the possibility of interference in the course of nature by spirits other than God, whether good or evil, but never without God’s permission.” Well, then, the Christian using the Holy Name, or the sacramental words (if he has competence to do so), and doing what he is doing entirely with the idea of

24 THE FORM OF THE SACRAMENTS

promoting God's work, is not seeking to work otherwise than by the power of God. He is certainly "interfering with the ordinary course of physical nature by apparently inadequate means," and that by the "recitation of formularies." If it can be conceded that "magical" formularies have power *in themselves*—and whether it can be conceded or not the writer is unable to make up his mind, though he tends to think it cannot be—then it must be conceded that the sacramental formularies *can* have force in themselves. It is important for our enquiry to remember that some have stoutly held that they can, and, as we have seen, this seems to have been the view of the Early Fathers. In more modern times there is the Cult of the Name of Jesus started by St Bernardine of Siena. This Saint and eminent preacher was a stern denunciator of superstition. Yet he attributed such power to the Name of Jesus *in itself* that he caused it to be inscribed on little silver tablets, and, while inveighing against amulets and charms, suggested to sponsors at Baptism that they should "give him one of these silver-gilt tablets of the Name of Jesus...that the child may wear it for devotion's sake: not because it is of silver or gold, but because of the virtue residing in that most holy Name¹." It is not so easy a question to decide as it may seem at first sight!

¹ 40 *Seraphin*, Opera III. 282.

CHAPTER V

THE DOCTRINE OF INTENTION

HAVING now considered the main purpose for which the Sacraments were instituted, the nature of the minister, and the nature of the form he is to use, we are in a favourable position for the consideration of the real subject of our enquiry, the doctrine of Intention. The minister has to use the words. He is not a mere machine, like a gramophone, even if he is a mere servant. He is, as St Thomas Aquinas will be found to remind us, an *animate instrument*, possessing a mind and a free will. The words depend upon the minister for their pronouncement. Apart from his voice they have no life, however much power they may possess once they are pronounced. In order that they may have life they must be employed, incarnated—as it were—by the minister. In order to employ them he must exercise his mind to some extent, give to them some degree of *attention*. He must also *intend* something by them. This is the case even when a man speaks or reads words he does not understand. Take the instance of a man newly arrived in a foreign country, not understanding the language, but able to imitate sounds. Conceive such a man to be asked by one of his own countrymen already resident to take a verbal message to a native in the native tongue, which message he has

learnt by heart without knowing what the words mean. He still *intends* something by the message, *i.e.* he intends to deliver it faithfully and knows that if he does so it will mean something to the native to whom he is to deliver it. Such a case is of frequent occurrence. As to the *attention* of the minister, in the case of the employment of words on a solemn occasion, *e.g.* in preaching or giving counsel, his *attention* must needs be great, and the *intention* with which he uses his words clear and unmistakable; otherwise he will fail of his object. In the case of the form of a Sacrament, supplied him by the Church, his attention (recollection) ought to be great morally but need not be actually¹, inasmuch as it is a familiar formula which he is using, and so his mind may easily wander. All this will not be disputed. But the question of his *intention* is more difficult.

There are three sets of views on the subject, held by:

1. Those who deny that the minister need have any particular intention at all. Among these are a considerable school in the twelfth century, to be

¹ Cf. Prummer, *Vademecum Theologiae Moralis*, p. 305: "Ad *validam* sacramentorum administrationem sufficit et requiritur attentio *externa*; ad *licitam* vero administrationem requiritur attentio *interna* excludens omnem divagationem mentis. Quare minister voluntarie distractus durante administratione sacramentorum valide quidem sed illicite administrat."

followed later by Luther, Calvin, and, apparently, Jewel.

2. Those who maintain that the exterior acts of the minister are sufficient evidence of his intention. Among these are Catharinus and his school, and Hooker.

3. Those who maintain that the *interior* intention of the minister must be taken into account as well, because it can affect the Sacrament.

This view was defended at length by Cardinal Bellarmine—as we shall see—and is the view taken by most Roman Catholic theologians of the present day. We shall proceed to examine these three sets of views at some length in subsequent chapters. Before we do so, we had better deal with certain points which are agreed upon by all those who consider that any intention of the minister must be taken into account.

The first of these points is the *degree* of intention necessary, *i.e.* really, the amount of *attention* which must be given by the minister. Intention may be (a) *actual*; (b) *virtual*; (c) *habitual*; (d) *interpretative*. We may conveniently borrow words from the article on Intention in the *Catholic Encyclopaedia* to illustrate these points.

“First there is the actual intention, speaking, namely, with the advertence of the intellect. Secondly, there is the virtual intention. Its form is borrowed entirely from a prior volition, which is

28 THE DOCTRINE OF INTENTION

accounted as continuing in some result produced by it. In other words, the virtual intention is not a present act of the will, but rather a power (*virtus*) come about as the result of a former act, and now at work for the attainment of the end. The thing, therefore, that is wanting in a virtual, as contrasted with an actual, intention is not of course the element of will, but rather the attention of the intellect, and that particularly of a reflex kind. So, for example, a person having made up his mind to undertake a journey may during its progress be entirely preoccupied with other thoughts. He will nevertheless be said to have all the while the virtual intention of reaching his destination. Thirdly, an habitual intention is one that once actually existed, but of the present continuance of which there is no positive trace; the most that can be said of it is that it has never been retracted. And fourthly, an interpretative intention is one that as a matter of fact has never been really elicited; there has been and is no actual movement of the will; it is simply the purpose which it is assumed a man would have had in a given contingency, had he given thought to the matter."

It is agreed that if *actual* intention is not present, *virtual* intention suffices for the administration of the Sacraments. A priest *ought*, morally, to have the spirit of the "Ego volo celebrare Missam, etc." vividly before him all through the Mass. But

unfortunately "the flesh is weak," and *virtual* intention will be all he manages. St Thomas Aquinas¹ appears to say that *habitual* intention is all that is required. But his explanation of his use of the word "habitual" makes it quite clear that he really means "virtual."

The second agreed point is that the minister, being the instrument of Christ and His Church, must have the intention of doing "what Christ and His Church does," as St Thomas puts it, using a phrase invented by William of Auxerre.

The third point of agreement flows from the second, and is this: that, just as the moral state of the minister cannot affect the Sacraments, so neither can his faith. As St Thomas² has put it: "A perverse intention perverts the work of the intender, but not the work of a second person; and so by that perverted intention of the minister is perverted that which he does in the Sacraments in so far as the work is his, but not in so far as it is the work of Christ, Whose minister he is." On this principle Cardinal Bellarmine³ gives a very wide range to the expression "what Christ and His Church intends." (1) In the first place the intention of the minister may be quite *general* and not necessarily *particular*, *i.e.* a particular intention of baptizing, absolving, confirming, etc., but merely a

¹ *Summ. Theol.* III. Q. 64, art. 8.

² *Loc. cit.*

³ *De Sacr. in genere*, Ch. 26.

general intention of "taking a service," as some of us would say. (2) He need not by the word "Church" understand the Roman Church but "whatever stands in his mind for the true Church." (3) It suffices even if by the "Church" he means a false Church, such as that of Calvinistic Geneva. For his "true Church" stands for him for the Universal Church. The Cardinal goes on to give this as the reason why those baptized by "the Church of Geneva" are not re-baptized on reception into the Roman Church, on the ground that the two Churches do not differ on the score of Baptism but merely of the ceremonies of Baptism. It was a similar reason, of course, which led St Augustine to accept the baptisms of the Donatists.

It is in the irony of things that, if a contrary custom prevails among modern Roman Catholics with regard to converts, that has come about largely through the adoption of Bellarmine's views on the subject of Intention. They "cannot be sure of the intention of the minister" even though he has used water and the right form, all that the Church really requires. Canon Lacey¹ and Mr Denny have collected various opinions from recognised theologians besides Bellarmine, such as Lehmkuhl (who bases himself on St Alphonsus Liguori), Liebermann, and Cardinal Franzelin, and show how wide a range of intention is ad-

¹ *De hier. Angl.* Ch. iv. p. 96.

mitted. Thus, taking the question of Orders as the Sacrament (for they are dealing with this in particular), they find that (1) The minister of a Sacrament, in order to have a right intention, need not necessarily intend what the Church intends; (2) need not necessarily intend to do what the Roman Church does; (3) satisfies requirements if he intends to do what some particular Church is accustomed to do, which he thinks to be a part of the true Church; (4) is not required to celebrate a rite as being a sacred one; (5) Ordination is valid if the minister intends to do what Christ instituted even with a confused idea of what that is; (6) if the minister with a general intention wished to confer Orders which Christians are wont to confer, or something similar; (7) even if the minister did not know what Order is, or whence it springs, provided that he intended to ordain; (8) even if the minister did not wish that the rite which he is engaged in performing should be a Sacrament or should convey grace. The one case in which the intention of the minister affects the Sacrament adversely is the case of a contrary intention by which the minister, with an expressed and positive act of his will determined within himself "I do not wish to ordain," or "I do not wish to confer the Sacrament of Order." This is a wide-reaching list; of the last point we shall hear more in subsequent chapters.

32 THE DOCTRINE OF INTENTION

Besides the intention of the minister, there is also the intention of the recipient of the Sacraments to be considered. This, as we shall see in Chap. VII, is quoted by Salmeron¹ as "a parallel case" to that of the minister. That is, he must have some intention. There are instances in the history of the Primitive Church of ordination being forced upon unwilling recipients. For instance, St Cyprian² mentions one Cornelius, who "suffered violence to force him to receive the episcopate." St Gregory Nazianzen also received the priesthood in the same way. There seems to be evidence, though, that it was not *entirely* against their will that these received these Sacraments. In any case, the incidents happened before the Church had been able to give due consideration to the theology of the subject. The Church sufficiently shows her mind that the recipient also must have *some* intention of receiving a Sacrament by her provision of sponsors in the case of Infant Baptism. In the case of Adult Baptism, then the candidate is either directly asked whether he desires to receive Baptism, or, as in the case of our own office for that rite, it is taken for granted that he does. Like the minister, it is simply required, as Catharinus³ has put it, that he "submit himself to the custom of

¹ See Ch. vii. Salmeron's 9th argument.

² *Epist.* lv. 8.

³ See Appendix.

the Church, suffer himself to be baptized in the regular manner." Then he receives "character," "even if he approaches with a feigned and heretical mind" (*ficto animo et haeretico*). In the latter case he does not receive grace but only "character": he may not be re-baptized. St Augustine, as we shall see in the next chapter, limited the grace of the Sacraments to the Church, save in certain exceptional instances. But where the minister is validly appointed, uses the proper matter and form, and intends to do "what the Church does," then later reflection admits at anyrate some degree of grace, while always conscious of the effect of schism.

CHAPTER VI

THE NO-INTENTION SCHOOL

ST THOMAS AQUINAS, dealing with the question of Intention, begins his article¹ (viii) on "Whether the intention of the minister is required for the perfection of the Sacrament" with noticing the view that "no intention is required." As usual, he states the opposite case first and then deals with it in his reply. He states the case of the No-Intentionists thus: "It seems that the intention of the minister is not required for the perfection of the Sacrament; for the minister acts in the Sacraments as an instrument (*instrumentaliter*): but the action is not perfected according to the intention of the instrument, but according to the intention of the principal agent; therefore the intention of the minister is not required for the perfection of the Sacrament." The answer he gives to this is: "an inanimate instrument has no intention in respect of the effect, but in place of intention is the movement by which it is moved by the principal agent: but an animate instrument, as the minister is, is not only moved but also in some way (*quodammodo*) moves himself, in so far as by his own will he sets his members to work;

¹ *Loc. cit.*

and so his intention is required, by which he may subject himself to the principal agent, namely, that he may intend to do what Christ and the Church does." The opinion which St Thomas stated in order to disagree with it, was held by a large School in the twelfth century, the second great period of theological activity. It aroused violent opposition in Hugh of St Victor, who was the centre of the opposing School. The disputations between these two Schools mark the second epoch in the history of the doctrine we are considering, the first being the epoch of St Augustine. Both these Schools claimed to be his successors, and both took up the question where he had left it. So we must once again turn to St Augustine. Up to his time the doctrine had not called for particular solution. As in so many other matters, the Church had acted rather than theorised. But the case of the baptisms conferred by the Donatists made St Augustine turn his attention, and direct the great gifts of his mind, to the subject. "Were those baptized by the Donatists really baptized?" That was the question he had to solve. A treatise *On Baptism, against the Donatists* was the result. At the end of this treatise St Augustine distinguishes between three classes of ministers of Baptism: (1) the holy ministers, true servants of Christ, *i.e.* Catholic Christians of good life; (2) orthodox ministers of evil life, still in the Church

but unworthy of her, "straw mixed with the wheat"; (3) ministers separated from the Church, *i.e.* heretics and schismatics. Baptisms conferred by the first two classes, he decides, are valid and fruitful, except where the fruit is poisoned by the bad life of the recipient. That is to say, "character" is conferred, but the grace not necessarily appropriated. As to the third class, their baptisms are valid, *i.e.* the "character" is conferred, but the grace is only received by those in good faith and in danger of death; otherwise grace is deferred until the recipient comes into unity with the true Church. Having got thus far, St Augustine proceeded to tackle the question of other extraordinary cases of Baptism, *e.g.* a baptism performed by an unbaptized person, and, specially, two cases of "fallacious" baptism: (1) performed in the Catholic Church, or in a sect which believed itself to be the Catholic Church (as the Donatists did), but "fallaciously"; (2) a baptism performed for amusement, *e.g.* by children at play, or by actors on a stage. As to these "fallacious" baptisms St Augustine gives this opinion: "I do not doubt that even those receive Baptism, who, although they receive it fallaciously (*fallaciter*), still receive it in the Church, or where the Church is thought by them to be." And he claims the support of the Church in this: those so baptized were not directed to be re-baptized.

What did he mean by "fallaciously"? It looks as though he meant "without serious intention" either on the part of the minister or the recipient or both. But Cardinal Franzelin¹ considers that he really meant the total absence of faith in either minister or recipient or both. And the Cardinal explains this by the case of an insincere conversion from motives of self-interest, an easy case to suppose at that period, when Christianity had so recently become the State religion. Yet the parallel case given by St Augustine renders this interpretation difficult. Other authors, especially those of the School of Catharinus (who upheld, as we noticed in the last chapter, the "exterior intention" view), hold that the "fallacious" baptism is a case in which the due matter and form are employed but the interior intention of minister or recipient or both is to regard the thing with derision as meaning nothing. St Augustine offers no solution as to the case of baptisms performed "for amusement." He had not, apparently, heard of the case of Athanasius. But what he has said on the other two cases is what is really important for us here. It was from this point, and also from the baptism of his playmates by St Athanasius, that the discussions in the twelfth century started. The view that roused the vehement opposition of Hugh of St Victor was stated thus by

¹ *De Sacr. in genere*, Ch. xvi. Schol. ii.

Roland¹: "If any adult having come to years of discretion is baptized, it would be necessary that he should have the intention of baptism, and it will be a real and proper baptism, whether he who baptizes have intention or not, provided that baptism is given in the form of the Church. But if it is a boy who is baptized, his intention is not required, nor does it matter whether he who baptizes have the intention of giving baptism or not, provided it is done in the form of the Church." Hugh of St Victor also reports that: "certain ignorant men think that the words which were instituted to consecrate the Eucharist, pronounced by any person at all, in any place whatsoever, and with whatever intention they like, over the bread and wine, have the effect of consecration and sacring, as though the Sacraments of God were so instituted, that they do not admit of reason in their operation (*nullam operandi rationem*)²."

This opinion seems wild enough; for one thing, it abolishes the necessity of any particularly constituted ministry, with well-defined powers. The effect of such teaching seems to have been to pave the way for the repudiation of the Catholic teaching concerning Holy Orders. At any rate it is the view we find Calvin³ to hold. After inveighing

¹ *Sent.* (Gietl, p. 206).

² *De Sacr.* Bk. ii. 6. 13.

³ *Antid. Concil. Trid. Sess. 7, Canon 11.*

against "the silly talk they make about the intention of consecrating," which he declares was "put forth by sophists and supported by no probable reason," he goes on to say: "I defer so much to the sacrosanct institution of Christ, that if some Epicurean, inwardly deriding the whole proceeding were to give me the Supper in accordance with Christ's command and according to the form laid down by Him and using a legitimate rite, I should not doubt that the bread and cup proffered by his hand were to me real pledges (*pignora*) of the Body and Blood of Christ."

Similarly Luther¹: "I should not doubt, if anyone accepted Baptism in the name of God, even if an impious minister did not give it in the name of God, that the man was truly baptized in the name of God. For the virtue of Baptism does not lie so much in the faith of the conferrer as of the recipient, as for instance in the story of the actor who was baptized by way of a joke²."

¹ *De Captiv. Babyl.* Ch. on "Baptism."

² The story alluded to was the story of St Genesius, told in his *Acta*. St Genesius was a comedian and conceived the idea that it would amuse Diocletian if he parodied the ceremonies of Christian Baptism on the stage. While he was actually engaged in this parody, he was converted suddenly, performed his part with all seriousness, and received Baptism with every intention of receiving it actually. Dom Leclercq (*Les Martyres*, vol. II. p. 428) calls in question the historical accuracy of this story. Tillemont (*Mémoires*, vol. IV) defends it.

Bellarmino remarks that¹: "in our time a new heresy has arisen, namely that no intention is required in the minister of the Sacrament, but that the Sacrament is in all respects perfected if the thing (matter) and the words are present, even if the minister performs that action in jest, or derisively, or fictitiously, or mendaciously." Bellarmine's date is 1542-1621. By his time the view that *some* intention is required on the part of the minister was accepted by all: the point in dispute was about *exterior* or *interior* intention. But he is not right in describing the position he indicates as "a new heresy." As we have seen, Luther and Calvin were only successors and not originators. Their view stretches back to the twelfth century. But they both give a new emphasis to the *recipient*. On their theory of Faith that is to be expected. They were really not interested in the minister of the Sacrament. The revolution in religion with which their names are associated so prominently was partly occasioned by the abuses into which the clergy had fallen. This is mere commonplace and cannot be gainsaid. So the pendulum swung full round, and the "congregation" became the centre of interest.

We have already remarked that Anglican writers have dealt very little with the subject of Intention. We may as well make the most of what we have

¹ *Op. cit.*

from their pens. So we will proceed to give the two passages in which Bishop Jewel treats of it. At least his style is vigorous and arresting. The first is from his *Reply to Harding*¹, the Jesuit, and is as follows: "Whereas he saith, 'the priest must have intention to do at least what the Church doeth'; unless he be well assured of the Church's doing herein, he cannot be sure of his own intention; and so must he say Mass with intention to do he knoweth not what. Now it appeareth that the Church is not yet resolved upon one intention. For the intention of the Church of Rome is to work the transubstantiation of bread and wine: the Greek Church hath never that intention, as is plain by the Council of Florence. The intention of the Church of Rome is to consecrate with Christ's words: the intention of the Greek Church is to consecrate with prayers. And whether of these Churches shall the priest follow with his intention? This is the very danger of uncertainty. The heart of man is inscrutable. If we stay upon the intention of a mortal man, we may stand in doubt of our own baptism."

On this we may remark, (1) he is really dealing with "interior" intention and his final remark stresses the main difficulty which haunts those who adopt that view; (2) his difficulty about the Churches is amply met afterwards, as we have

¹ Parker Soc. i. 139.

already seen, by Bellarmine. Only unfortunately Jewel lived before Bellarmine's time (his date is 1522-71). But at that time the difficulty had, apparently, not been squarely faced. This need not surprise us: the split in the West was so recent a thing, and the East was a long way off and so commonly left out of account.

The next passage, from Jewel's *Sermon at Paul's Cross*¹, deals with the general disadvantage of uncertainty in the Sacraments to the laity, especially in the Mass. "What if the priest happen not to consecrate?" he remarks, "what if he leave out the words of consecration, and never speak them? As it is known that some priests have done many years together. Or what if the priest have no intention or mind to consecrate? What case standeth the poor people then in? Or what thing is it that they worship? Christ's Body cannot be there without consecration: consecration there can be none, as they themselves have taught, if there miss either pronounciation and utterance of the words or else purpose to consecrate and intention. And how can the people know with what intention or mind the priest goeth to the Mass? Or whether he hath duly pronounced the words? or whether he hath consecrated or no? And knowing none of these things, which in very deed is not possible for them to know, how can they be well assured

¹ Parker Soc. i. 13.

that it is the Body of Christ that the priest holdeth up, and whereunto they fall down and give godly honour?" Here again Jewel refers to "interior" intention and reiterates the difficult position to which it leads. At the risk of a digression, we may perhaps illustrate his other point by a reference to the *Sermons* of St Bernardine of Siena (1380-1444), who lived a little over a century before Jewel. He was practically the second founder of the Franciscan Order, a very fearless and powerful preacher, and the chief figure in the religious life of Italy during the early Renaissance. He attacked all abuses impartially, and did not spare those of his own brethren in the ranks of the clergy. He tells the following story¹: Two priests were talking together. Said one to the other: "How do you say the words of the consecration of the Body of Christ?" "I say, '*Hoc est corpus meum*,'" answered the other. "That's wrong," quoth the first, and they began to wrangle over it. Meanwhile a third priest came up, and, on being informed of the dispute, said: "You're both wrong, for the proper words are, '*Hoc est corpusso meusso*,' you say '*corpusso*' therefore you have got to say '*meusso*.'" The disputants, still unconvinced, appealed to a neighbouring parish priest. "Oh," said he, "why do you make such a fuss when I hit it off so simply? I just say an

¹ *Predic.* vol. II. 127.

Ave Maria over it!" A man with as many enemies as St Bernardine made for himself by his zeal dare not tell a story like that unless there were truth behind it. It amply illustrates Jewel's point. It also probably goes some way to account for the insistence on the power of the words of institution which we have met in the twelfth century. If the clergy were careless at least our Lord would not be.

To sum up this chapter, we cannot help admiring the anxiety shown by this School to preserve the position of Christ as the real minister of the Sacraments; to give even exaggerated reverence to the power of the words He left to His Church for the confection of the Sacraments; to preserve intact and free from doubt the mind of the recipient. We may also note and admire an anxiety on the part of some of them to remember that the laity also are "a royal priesthood¹," even if they concentrate an exaggerated attention on them. But we must also note the difficulties into which their position leads them, and remark how, as a matter of fact, their theory led to a depreciation of the ministry which, equally with His words, our Lord left behind Him in the due equipment of His Church.

The question raised by Jewel and illustrated by the passage we have quoted from St Bernardine is "another story" and no part of our enquiry.

¹ 1 Pet. ii. 9.

Whether the advent into popularity in the West of the Greek doctrine of "Economy" (the germs of which are to be found in St Augustine and other Fathers), by which the Church in the plenitude of her power throws her mantle over irregular acts done in good faith, can be of help in the matter it is not for us here to enquire, though we may, perhaps, be pardoned for making the suggestion. But there is at least this relevance in the digression we permitted ourselves. Those who consider that the *interior* intention of the minister must be taken into account are wont to plead that much must always be left in human affairs to the mercy and loving-kindness of God Himself for His children, and that He will make up in some other way for defects in the Sacraments. If it proved inevitable to accept the views of the Interior-Intentionist School, and we could not in the nature of things accept any other view, then there would be comfort in the consideration they suggest. But if it is true that God wills that His children shall have certainty with regard to the Sacraments, then we must surely scrutinise very closely any School which seems to imperil this certainty.

CHAPTER VII

THE EXTERIOR-INTENTION SCHOOL

BY the sixteenth century—the era of the Reformation and of the Council of Trent—it had come to be conceded that *some* intention was required on the part of the minister of the Sacraments. The point of division between the Schools was whether this intention is sufficiently expressed by the external acts of the minister using the proper form and the proper matter or whether his interior intention must also be taken into account. It was realised that, to use St Thomas' phrase, the minister was "*instrumentum animatum*," and therefore his mind must be active in some way while he is performing an act. What, then, was the relation of his mind to the act he is performing?

The *crux* of the whole matter is, of course, the difficulty, or even impossibility, of knowing the mind of the minister and the danger of disturbing the certainty of the faithful in their reception of the Sacraments and the necessity of providing against scruples. This is, obviously, a real danger, even a tremendous danger; and we shall find that the upholders of the necessity of taking external actions only into account as sufficiently indicative of the intention of the minister constantly refer to

it. Their concern is the security of the faithful in the means through which Christ has willed them to obtain grace. And it will be agreed that no consideration could possibly be more important. The Church has always shown her anxiety to protect the faith of her members, and it is just this anxiety which explains her acceptance, with St Augustine, of Sacraments conferred even "fallaciously" and in sport, provided the proper form and matter were used. So that those who say, with Catharinus and his followers—whose views we are now to consider—that a duly constituted minister who employs the ceremonies authorised by the Church must be presumed to intend to do what the Church does, are so far in line with the Fathers and the Church. Still, there remains the teasing necessity of taking into due and full account the fact that the minister, though an instrument, is an *animate* instrument. If Catharinus and his School can be said to be in the true line of succession to those who before had proclaimed that no intention on the part of the minister was required by the Church, in order to safeguard the faith of the recipient, yet *could* the Church fail to make such a requirement from an *animate* instrument? In the nature of things *some* intention must be posited in a rational being who has to lend himself to the performance of certain actions. "Unless he himself has some intention in his mind," as Canon Lacey and Mr Denny have

remarked¹, "his whole action becomes a mere gesticulation." It may conduce to clearness if we quote further from these two admirably lucid writers. "For every human act," they continue, "which has not an end in itself, is determined by some intention, which must be congruous with the reason of the act. Therefore a ministerial act is determined by a ministerial intention. To have a ministerial intention is nothing else than to subject one's own intention to the intention of another. Nor is it at all necessary that a minister should either have *this intention of another* or even understand it. The sole requirement is that he himself should intend to do what the other wishes done, whatever that may be." The minister is, no doubt, a rational instrument, but he always remains *an instrument only*. If he acts in his own person, he ceases to be an instrument.

We may now pass on to the consideration of the School of Catharinus. This School numbers in its ranks illustrious writers, and takes its name from Ambrose Catharinus, who was born at Siena in 1487. His name in the world was Lancelot Politi: he took the name under which he is best known on entering the Dominican Order. He was sent by his Order as a theologian to the Council of Trent, so that he was evidently a person of learning and importance. This view of him gains further con-

¹ *De hier. Anglica*, Ch. iv. p. 88.

firmation from the fact that he was appointed Bishop of Minori two years later (in 1547). He was among those Fathers of Trent who defined the dogmas connected with the Sacraments. He must have taken part in the discussions at Trent on the subject of Intention, and he defended his view that the *interior* intention of the minister need not be taken into account, in a treatise he published during the session of the Council entitled "*De necessaria intentione in perficiendis Sacramentis.*" Only two copies of this, so far as the writer is aware, exist in England at the present time, one at Merton College, Oxford, and the other at Lambeth. At the suggestion of the learned librarian at Lambeth a copy of this treatise is appended to this volume for the benefit of the industrious reader.

For our purpose here it seems best to take the treatise of Salmeron, a Spanish follower of Catharinus, given in his *Commentaries*, Tom. XIII. lib. i. pars iii. disput. ii. p. 186, a copy of which is in the library of the British Museum. With every respect to Catharinus, Salmeron's treatise seems to be clearer and better arranged, as sometimes happens when a disciple has followed the lead of a master and improved on it owing to opportunities of further thought and discussion. Salmeron was a Jesuit, born at Toledo in 1515, died at Naples in 1585. He was thus a younger con-

temporary of Catharinus, and was a fellow theologian with him at the Council of Trent, whither he went with Lainez in 1546. With Lainez he made his mark at the Council, especially in the discussions on the doctrine of Justification. So, like Catharinus, he is a person to be taken into account, and he has a clear and pleasant style.

He begins his Disputation thus: "There remains one scruple to be resolved concerning the intention of the minister in conferring a Sacrament. If that is absent, the Sacrament is not performed, since it is laid down by all that this is of the substance of the Sacrament itself. If therefore the minister were not to intend either to baptize, or to consecrate the Host, or to promote to the priesthood, there would be no Baptism, no Host to be adored, no Sacrament of ordination. Again, it will be in doubt whether the Bishop who initiates and ordains priests were rightly and legitimately taken into the episcopate, and again whether the Bishop who promoted him to the episcopate did so with a legitimate and Catholic rite; and at that rate one could go on to infinity, and everything would be in a position of doubt, *et Academici omnes et nutantes redderemur.*" The latter words do not lend themselves to neat translation, though their sense is obvious: we should all be reduced to the position of mere theorists hesitating in their opinions. The similarity of this

picture with that drawn by Jewel at St Paul's Cross does not need emphasising.

As usual in those times of clear thought and accurate discussion, Salmeron begins by stating the opposite case in order that his readers may see clearly what he is answering. He begins his answer by distinguishing between two "intentions," (1) "*public*," *i.e.* that of the Church itself "whose ministry he performs whoever it be who dispenses Sacraments"; (2) "*private*," *i.e.* special to the minister himself. With regard to the "public" intention, he declares that "this intention is sufficiently expressed in the forms themselves of the Sacraments," and that it "is inseparable from the words themselves, if they are pronounced in full (*integre*) as they should be." The "private" intention may be either that the minister (*a*) does not believe in anything of what he is doing; (*b*) does it in mockery (*derisorie*); (*c*) has a contrary intention of not conferring the Sacrament and its effect, even though he administers the Sacraments in the customary form of the Church.

The possibility of the latter intention existing will be found to be the principal point insisted upon by those who uphold the necessity of taking *interior* intention into full account. And it is, unfortunately, a possibility which has to be faced, though a very exceptional possibility, as one may well believe. With regard to this very important

point, Salmeron insists that the private intention of the minister *cannot be so strong and efficacious that it can vitiate the Sacrament*, provided that the priest "otherwise wills to do what the Church does."

We may here notice that, as Tournély¹ has pointed out, the Council of Trent required in the minister "*an intention at anyrate general of doing what the Church does*," but not an intention of doing *what the Church intends*. The stress is on the *action* of the Church and, consequently, on *the action* of the minister who represents her.

Salmeron supports his thesis by ten arguments, which we will now proceed to notice.

1. "Since the Sacrament is an external and sensible (*sensibile*) sign instituted by God for the sanctification of man, but the private intention of the minister lies hid in his heart and is insensible (*insensibilis*) and interior, it cannot be an essential part of a sensible thing, such as the Sacrament is."

2. Private intention cannot be known. Therefore if it is to be taken into account, God must have meant us to be eternally troubled with scruples. This is contrary to Scripture and the Fathers. Catharinus uses much the same argument.

¹ *De Sacr.* qu. vii. art. i: "Quia synodus Tridentina exigit tantum a ministro Sacramentorum ut intendat facere *quod Ecclesia facit*, non ait ut intendat facere *quod Ecclesia intendit*." Tournély (1658-1729) was a Doctor of the Sorbonne and is described in the *Cath. Encycl.* as "one of the most notable theologians of his age."

3. If private intention is to count, then "the salvation of man, the remission of sins, the grace of the Holy Spirit, the power of the Blood of Christ hang upon the arbitrament of men, and men can do more hurt than Christ can give help. Paul, then, did not speak correctly when he dealt thus with the ministers of the Word and Sacrament: 'I watered...but He Who gives the increase is God.' He ought to have said, then, 'Who gives the increase is the minister or the intention of God's minister.'"

4. Could the Church speak with such certainty of the means of salvation if they were dependent on an unknown quantity? "How could even Paul declare so positively: 'but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified,' if the Sacraments were capable of being impeded by the malice and fraud of the ministers?"

5. "Many would suffer from the malice of one, which is a thing far removed from the divine goodness and wisdom....It is of faith that no simple and innocent person can be deprived of the fruit of the Sacraments on account of the corrupt intention of the minister." He supports this by Scripture and by St Chrysostom, who says, as we have already noticed, that "the priest (but) lends tongue and hand: for it is not just that on account of the malice of another those seeking the means of salvation should be offended." This passage

from St Chrysostom, especially the latter sentence, greatly disturbs the minds of the opposing School, as we shall see. Catharinus also examines it.

6. Private intention provides an unlimited opening for doubts, which may even extend to doubt of the Orders of the minister. "And so one may be compelled to doubts about the whole hierarchy of the Church, and so about the whole Church of Christ."

7. The Apostles had no right, then, to entrust Baptisms, etc., to those of whose intention they could not be certain. This argument is far-reaching indeed.

8. If the intention of the minister is of the essence of the Sacrament, how, then, can Jews, etc., baptize? He quotes on this point the decision of Pope Nicholas I on the subject. The question as to whether those baptized by a Jew or a Pagan were to be re-baptized had been referred to him. His reply was: "Those who were baptized in the Name of the Sacred Trinity, or even in the Name of Jesus, as is read in the Acts of the Apostles, ought not to be re-baptized, because the Baptism is not theirs but His (*quia non illorum sed ejus est*)."

Salmeron, as also Catharinus, points out that the Pope expressed no doubt as to the intention of the minister, "for he knew that the form rightly (*recte*) pronounced by the minister was sufficient."

He then goes on: The essence of a Sacrament consists in matter and form, like any other thing in nature. The minister, and his intention, and the disposition of the recipient of the Sacrament, are outside its essence. Administering, therefore, the matter and form, he performs the Sacrament, *provided* (1) *he does not make an exterior protest of his unwillingness to administer, nor* (2) *adds anything which could vitiate the form.* For he has the intention which suffices, namely, that of applying that Sacrament to the recipient, because he does this of set purpose and intention. And although in his heart he thinks it no Sacrament, or intends in his mind to confer no Sacrament, *he lies*, because he testifies by the very act that he is giving a thing, that is, a Sacrament, although interiorly he has other thoughts, or alleges that he wished to confer it either in jest or not seriously. For a man who gives another a big slap in the face, and then protests in word that he did not intend to do him any harm, would certainly be lying, and *one must stand on the fact rather than on the word*, because, as the lawyers say, "it would be a protestation against fact." If a notary were to draw up an instrument with all the requisite conditions and circumstances, but in his own heart intended to draw such an instrument up in derision, yet in reality the instrument would be valid. He here brings in the case of St Athanasius' baptisms, which we have already referred to more than once.

This argument seems to the writer to be a very strong one indeed.

9. The parallel case of the recipient is cited, who, even if he approaches the Sacrament with false or heretical mind, receives it.

10. He adduces the testimony of St Augustine, in bk. 1 of "*contra literas Petiliani Donatistae*." This treatise deals with a controversy which Petilianus had provoked concerning a certain baptism. He had declared it uncertain until the conscience of the man who gave Baptism could be ascertained. To which St Augustine replies: "What does it matter if the conscience of the giver remains hid, and was perhaps stained with sin?" The work of Christ cannot depend upon the conscience of a man, otherwise all salvation would be uncertain, and the Scripture would be contradicted which says: "it is better to trust in God than to trust in man." The faithful might make reply: "The conscience of man is often unknown, but I am certain of the mercy of Christ."

Salmeron also adduces the testimony of "the three princes of Scholastic Theology," St Thomas Aquinas¹, St Bonaventure, and Alexander of

¹ St Thomas, P. III. Q. 64, art. 8. ii, says: "Alii melius dicunt quod minister sacramenti agit in persona totius Ecclesiae, cujus est minister. In verbis autem quae profert exprimitur intentio Ecclesiae, quae sufficit ad perfectionem sacramenti, nisi contrarium exterius exprimatur ex parte ministri vel recipientis sacramentum." It will be noticed that he here concurs exactly with Salmeron's 8th argument.

Hales. What St Thomas has said we have already examined. Cajetan does not agree with the interpretation Salmeron gives and in which St Bonaventure supports him. Salmeron says: "I am not ignorant that Cajetan obscured the words of St Thomas, so open and clearer than the light at

The "melius" is opposed to the opinion of those (*e.g.* of Alexander of Hales) who held that in the case of a Sacrament necessary to salvation, *e.g.* Baptism, our Lord makes up for deficiencies of "mental" (*i.e.* interior) intention on the part of the minister if the recipient is a child; if an adult, his own faith and devotion make up the deficiency. St Thomas is thus directly confronted with the "interior intention" School and dissociates himself from them. In his *Commentary on the IVth book of Sentences*, Dist. 6, Q. 1, art. 2, he says even more clearly: "Alii dicunt quod in baptismo, et aliis sacramentis quae habent in forma actum exercitum, non requiritur mentalis intentio, sed sufficit expressio intentionis per verba ab Ecclesia instituta: et ideo si forma servatur nec aliquid exterius dicitur, quod intentionem contrariam exprimat, baptizatus est. Non enim sine causa in sacramentis necessitatis, scilicet baptismo et quibusdam aliis, actus baptizantis tam sollicite expressus est ad intentionis expressionem."

In this opinion he has the support of Pope Innocent IV (*In quinque libros decretalium Commentaria*, tit. 42, ch. 2, "*De baptismo et ejus effectu*"): "Non est necesse quod baptizans sciat quid sit Ecclesia, quid baptizatus et unde sit, nec quod gerat in mente facere quod facit Ecclesia: imo si contrarium gereret in mente, scilicet non facere quod facit Ecclesia sed tamen facit, quia formam servat, nihilominus baptizatus est dummodo baptizare intendat."

Alexander of Hales, iv. Q. 8, membr. 3, art. 1: "Baptizans efficitur minister Ecclesiae per hoc quod intendit Ecclesia; unde necessaria est intentio." St Bonaventure, iv. *Sent.* D. 6, p. 2, art. 2, Q. 1, agrees with St Thomas that the minister, being a rational being, must have intention.

mid-day, by twisted and violent interpretations." Cajetan, of course, is of the opposite School and is naturally anxious to enlist St Thomas on his side. St Bonaventure says: "But because, as St Augustine determines, Baptism is a Sacrament of faith not of a single person but of the whole Church, therefore the faith of a person forms no obstacle to it, confers no benefit. And therefore another position is determined, namely, that whatever the state of faith in the heart of the baptizer, one must judge of the baptism only according to the expression of his mouth or speech; and therefore in whatever sort he believes, if he expresses the whole Trinity, the person is baptized; but if not the whole, then he is not baptized and must be baptized again. And this is what the Master (*i.e.* St Thomas) commonly and with certitude affirms."

Salmeron has also, of course, to deal with the decree of the Council of Trent on the subject of Intention (11th Canon of 7th Session): "*Si quis doceret in ministris, dum Sacramentum conficiunt et conferunt, non requiri intentionem saltem faciendi quod facit Ecclesia, anathema sit.*" This he stoutly maintains to refer to the "*public*" intention, and he supports his arguments by the case of Penance. The confessor has not to do with contrition in the penitent in the sense of "interior sorrow for the sin" (*dolor internus de peccato*) but with contrition

expressed by "sorrow, words, and tears," *i.e.* exteriorly expressed. This seems to be a good argument, for Penance is the most intimate of the Sacraments as between conferrer and recipient.

The opinion of one who actually took part in the deliberations of the Council of Trent is peculiarly worth having as to the meaning to be attached to one of its decrees. We remark this specially as his opponents insist that the Decree refers to *interior* intention, and so try to make their teaching official to the exclusion of other Schools. We may add that, though the views we are to consider in the next chapter are those which have most commonly prevailed for some time in the Roman Communion, yet the views we have been considering in this chapter have never been officially condemned, though attempts have been made to get them condemned. If we may go by the opinion expressed in the last (1917) edition of the *Catholic Dictionary*, put forth, of course, with the due *imprimatur*, we may even see the School of Catharinus coming into official favour some day. "The opinion we have been defending," says the writer of the article on "The Sacraments" in the work we have just referred to, "was propounded by Catharinus, a Dominican theologian present at the very session in which the doctrine of intention was defined. Some time after the definition the work of Catharinus was reprinted at Rome in 1552

by Baldus, printer to the Apostolic Chamber (so Tournély). Cardinal Pallavicino, in his *History of the Council*, ix. 6, allows that the Fathers of Trent did not suspect, much less condemn, the doctrine of Catharinus. The great Jesuits Salmeron and Becanus, and the celebrated Dominican Contenson, espoused it. So in the last century did the learned Oratorian Juenin. It was defended in the Sorbonne in 1685 by Harlai, afterwards archbishop of Paris....It has never been censured by any competent authority, for a proposition condemned before Alexander VIII by the Roman Inquisition was, as Juenin shows, quite different. Fr Ryder, in his book on *Catholic Controversy*, admits that the question is still quite open, though he himself holds the contrary opinion. It is quite true that the majority of school theologians believe that the secret withholding of the intention is enough to invalidate the Sacrament. Our objection to this, the common theory, is grounded on the fact that its advocates can adduce no proof from Scripture or tradition, while we fail to see the force of the argument from reason. Reason no doubt requires us to look on the administration of the sacraments as a human act distinguished by the outward circumstances from possible combinations of the same words and acts which have no sacramental character. But this does not carry us beyond the opinion of Catharinus."

We may end this chapter by two references from another of the few Anglican writers who have interested themselves in the doctrine of Intention, namely, Hooker. "Furthermore," he says¹, "because definitions are to express but the most immediate and nearest parts of nature, whereas other principles farther off, although not specified in defining, are notwithstanding in nature implied and presupposed, we must note that, inasmuch as Sacraments are actions religious and mystical, which nature they have not unless they proceed from a serious meaning, and what every man's private mind is, as we cannot know, so neither are we bound to examine, therefore always in these cases the known intent of the Church generally doth suffice, and where the contrary is not manifest, we may presume that he which outwardly doth the work, hath inwardly the purpose of the Church of God." Again², "The Church of God hitherto always constantly maintained...that if Baptism seriously be administered in the same element and with the same form of words which Christ's institution teacheth, there is no other defect in the world that can make it frustrate, or deprive it of the nature of a true Sacrament."

From which it will be apparent that Hooker adheres to the School of Catharinus.

¹ *E. P.* Bk. v. lviii. 3.

² *Ibid.* lxii. 12.

CHAPTER VIII

THE INTERIOR-INTENTION SCHOOL

THERE remains the case of those who teach that the *interior* intention of the minister must be taken into account. This is the opinion that, as we have said, has long held the first place in the teaching of Roman Catholic theologians. If we take Cardinal Bellarmine as its main exponent, we do so because, in his desire to confute Catharinus, he has written more fully on the subject than most.

Our enquiry has been narrowing itself all the time as we have pursued it. The necessity of *some* intention on the part of the minister is taken for granted. It is conceded that the minister, being "*instrumentum animatum*," is bound to have something in his mind when he does a thing. The real *cruces* are (1) whether a corrupt intention in his mind is capable of rendering a Sacrament null, and (2) if so, how is the faith of the simple to be safeguarded?

Cardinal Bellarmine, whom we take as a typical exponent of this School, was born at Montepulciano in 1542, and died in 1621. He was thus a younger contemporary of Salmeron, and, like him, a Jesuit. He had a distinguished career, and was promoted to the Sacred College in 1599, on

the ground that "the Church of God had not his equal in learning." So that he, Catharinus, and Salmeron make an illustrious trio.

Bellarmino, naturally enough, begins¹ with the consideration of the minister as "*instrumentum animatum*." He first examines the word "instrument." What exactly does it mean? There are various ways, he says, of employing an instrument. It may be (1) will-less, as in the case where a man employs the hand of another, or makes him bear burdens. This can be done without any volition on the part of the instrument. (2) There may be the case where a man employs a servant to read to him, or to point out something to someone, or to observe something and bring back a report, *i.e.* merely mechanical exercises of the mind and members, requiring no volition beyond that required to fulfil the external act. That is, the master uses as an instrument merely the tongue, eyes, etc. We break off at this point to remark the similarity here between Bellarmine and St Chrysostom. Bellarmine does not like the obvious comparison, and denies that his remark has any reference to intention. Rather, he contends, St Chrysostom was speaking about the *probity* of the minister, and means to say that the efficacy of the Sacraments did not depend upon the goodness (*bonitas*) of the minister but on the goodness of God alone. But

¹ *De Sacr. in genere*, lib. 1. Chs. xxvi, xxvii.

64 THE INTERIOR-INTENTION SCHOOL

the sense of the whole passage does not seem to support his contention. St Chrysostom wrote: "neither angel nor archangel is able to effect anything (ἐργάσασθαι τι δύναται) with regard to the things that have been given by God; but the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit administers (οἰκονομεῖ) all things, but the priest lends (δανίζει) a tongue, and stretches out his hand." There is a distinct reference, as the reader will see, to power and administration.

The third way of employing an instrument, Bellarmine goes on, is the case where *discretion* is required, *e.g.* in the case of a judge acting for a king. He regards the minister as belonging to this third class. The judge does not only need power given him to judge but also the will and the intention to exercise his functions. In support of this he quotes Matt. xxiv. 45: "Who then is that faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath made ruler over his household?"¹ The mention of his qualities of wisdom and fidelity implies dis-

¹ As to this particular passage (Matt. xxiv. 45) it may be interesting to recall the comment of St Hilary (*Comm. in Matt.*) on it: "although there is a common exhortation to us all to an unwearied care and watchfulness, a special solicitude is demanded of the leaders of the people, that is, of the bishops, in the matter of expecting Him and of the Advent." Here St Hilary gives a natural sense to the passage, referring it to the sphere of morals, and applying it to everyone, though specially to the bishops *as guardians of morals*.

cretion to do this, and not that. He also quotes Romans xii. 5, "he that ruleth, with diligence," and Heb. xiii. 17, "obey those that have the rule over you," and John xx. 23, "whosoever sins ye remit, etc." Clearly here our Lord left it to the arbitrament of His servants to remit and retain sins.

Again, there is a distinction between "speculative" and "practical" words. "Speculative" words have a fixed sense whoever employs them, be he drunk or sober, or even an ape, or Balaam's ass. "Practical" words are those which, besides their meaning, are *efficacious*. But their efficacy depends upon someone who has the power and the will to make them have their effect, *e.g.* the commands of a king differ from the commands of a private person. So one who has the power of working miracles may issue commands to diseases and demons which other people cannot. The reasons for this are that (1) words in themselves are not by nature operative; they have to be employed by one having power. (2) The one possessing power must will to put it in action; otherwise the power will not be used. *E.g.* if a king without intention in his sleep were to command someone to be killed, it would not be done until it was ascertained whether he really wished it, though he has the power to wish it.

At this point Bellarmine meets the objection that the words of the Sacraments have operative

power through Christ's institution; and so their action does not depend upon the power and intention of the minister. He replies to this by saying that (1) Cajetan and others hold that the operative power is in the minister himself efficiently and instrumentally (*efficienter et instrumentaliter*) as it is in the Sacrament. If this is so, the answer is easy. It is that there is operative power in the sacramental words, but that that power depends on the minister. So that the words only have power when they are conjoined with the power that resides in the minister. (2) Others think that the minister has no force in himself efficient in respect of justification, but that that wholly resides in the Sacraments. The minister only concurs by applying the Sacraments. For he who plants and waters (cf. 1 Cor. iii) does not produce efficiently and physically (*efficienter et physice*) the fruits of the tree, but applies agents (*agentia*). According to this opinion (with which he says some consider St Thomas to agree¹), ministers do not truly and

¹ St Thomas, *Summa Theol.* P. III. Q. 64, art. 1, the passage referred to here, is dealing with the question "Whether God alone operates interiorly for the effect of the Sacrament." He answers: "operari aliquem effectum contingit dupliciter: uno modo per modum principalis agentis: alio modo per modum instrumenti." As to the grace of the Sacrament, that is due to the operation of God alone. Character, also, an interior effect of some of the Sacraments, is "virtus instrumentalis," and flows from the principal agent, *i.e.* from God. "*Secundo autem modo homo potest operari ad in-*

personally (*vere et proprie*) consecrate, absolve, baptize, reconcile, etc. For there is this difference between voluntary agents and other things, that other things are not said to act personally (*proprie*) when they merely apply agents. Thus a cat is not said to set fire to a house personally, if it applies fire, but the house is said to have been burnt by accident. But voluntary agents, when they purposely apply agents, are said to act personally in the fullest sense (*propriissime*). For a doctor both personally cures a sick man, when he administers to him a healing medicine; and personally kills him when he purposely gives him poison instead of medicine. According to this opinion, the answer to the objection laid down, that sacramental words have no force except when they are set in motion by God as instruments, is this. They are not set in motion by God as instruments except when they are pronounced by him to whom He has given commission. Wherefore the sacramental words always in some way or other depend on the power and will of the minister.

Bellarmino then goes on to a *reductio ad absurdum* of the "power-solely-in-words" argument. He takes three instances: (1) a man bathing his

teriolem effectum sacramenti, inquantum operatur per modum ministri: nam eadem ratio est ministri, et instrumenti; utriusque enim actio exterius adhibetur, sed sortitur effectum interiolem ex virtute principalis agentis, quod est Deus."

child and saying the baptismal formula: has the child been baptized? (2) A priest reading a Gospel at table, *e.g.* in a Religious House, in which occur the words of consecration: does he thereby consecrate all the bread and wine present? (3) Anyone engaging a maidservant and saying "I take you for mine" ("*accipio te in meam*") where he means "my servant" though he does not say so in so many words. What if the girl thought he meant "wife" instead of "servant"?

With the effectiveness of this *reductio ad absurdum* probably everyone now would agree. That we should do so marks a growth in clearness from the ages when the "power-in-the-words-only" School flourished as a leading School with plenty to say for itself. It would be agreed too, we may remark in passing, that, Sacraments being, as Hooker says, "actions religious and mystical," a Sacrament performed in fun or in derision ought not to be accounted a true Sacrament. For *the setting is inappropriate*, just as the setting of Bellarmine's priest reading a Gospel at dinner is inappropriate. It is quite obvious that both Bellarmine's priest and the minister who acts "*derisorie*" or "*jocose*" have no real intention of performing a Sacrament.

As to what he says about the nature of the ministry, Canon Lacey and Mr Denny can again help us. As the result of research in the

writings of theologians they find three species of minister: (1) where a purely external act is required in the minister, like the filing and polishing of a piece of iron; (2) where an act is prescribed morally directed towards a certain end, as when a piece of iron is to be so filed and polished that it will fit into its appointed place in a machine; (3) where the intention only of the master is indicated, but the means left to the science of the agent, as when someone tells a servant to set a machine right. Our authors rule out the third class as comparable to the ministry, inasmuch as our Lord has provided His ministers with the matter and form of the Sacraments; they are not left to their own devices in so important a matter. It will be remarked that our authors completely disagree with Bellarmine. And a modern Roman Catholic writer¹ seems to disagree with him too when he says: "When he (the priest) is standing at the Altar he is merely the representative of Christ, Who works through him; but in the Confessional he acts more in his own character, '*Ego te absolvo.*'" The comparison which Bellarmine makes between the minister of the Sacraments and a judge, as also his reference to "stewards" and "rulers," suggest that he is making the Sacrament of Penance typical of the other Sacraments, whereas Canon Scannell rightly notices its rather

¹ Canon Scannell, in *The Priest's Studies*, p. 88.

exceptional character. And it is proverbially dangerous to press metaphors. The metaphor of the judge fits in with the minister of the Sacrament of Penance, but not in the way in which Bellarmine applies it. He has confused two things, as he shows by his citation of John xx. 23. The priest in the Confessional has, indeed, to judge. He has discretion to refuse absolution. But if he does so, he does so openly, just as a judge pronounces his sentence openly. It is by such actions that a judge is himself judged as to whether he has judged properly or not. But the judge has no discretion not to apply the law, or to pronounce a sentence openly with which he is in tacit and interior disagreement. It is *that* power of discretion which Bellarmine must posit if his metaphor is to be of any use to his argument. And just there it breaks down badly. As Salmeron pointed out, the open sentence would stand, whatever the judge's private disagreement with it.

Having dealt with the nature of the ministry, and the nature of the words, Bellarmine goes on to deal with the important question that, if, as is admitted, one can never be certain of the interior intention of the minister, then the recipient can never be certain he is receiving a true Sacrament. To this formidable objection he replies: a man ought not to demand infallible certitude as to his salvation or justification in this world, such

certitude as that of divine faith (*i.e.* metaphysical certitude). For this kind of certitude is not proper to this state of life. He quotes 1 Cor. x in support of this ("let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall"), and Phil. iii ("working out your salvation with fear and trembling"). He goes on to say "but human or moral certitude, that which suffices for the quieting of a man, that we have from the Sacraments, even if they depend on the intention of another. For since it is the easiest thing in the world to have an intention, there is no reason for doubting whether the minister has the intention, unless he shows the contrary by some exterior sign." As against Catharinus he argues, supported by Cajetan, that St Thomas *does* really require interior intention. We have already examined this point¹. Lastly, he deals with St Chrysostom again, who seems to haunt him, when that Doctor says: "it would not be just that on account of the baseness of another the faithful should suffer damage in the symbols of our salvation." As he interpreted, as we have seen, the rest of this passage as referring to the moral character of the minister, so here also. He denies that St Chrysostom's words have any reference to intention. Even if they have, he declares that it will very seldom (*rarissime*) happen that hurt will come, as he has argued above.

¹ See also Appendix for full discussion of it by Catharinus.

This does not resolve the real difficulty at all. However seldom it is *likely* to happen that the minister of a Sacrament will be so depraved as to pervert his intention secretly, still there is always the grim possibility to daunt the faith of the simple. The upholders of the view we are considering are wont to say that a depraved priest could always, if he wished to render a Sacrament null, arrange some defect in matter or form, especially in the latter. In most of the Sacraments the form is pronounced aloud, which eliminates this possibility to a large extent. In the Mass it has long been the pious custom both in the Eastern and the Western Churches to repeat the form of consecration in silence. The possibility of the abuse suggested might be an argument against this custom. We have glanced at this difficulty already in the case of the story told by St Bernardine. But to drag in another admitted difficulty is no argument for adding to difficulties already existing. To return to our main point: take the case of a Bishop who had a grudge against some particular ordinand. If interior intention is to count, then this Bishop might outwardly perform every ceremony with the utmost exactness which was necessary for the conferring of Order, and yet secretly say to himself, "I do not intend to ordain this particular man." This is certainly a possibility. And if so, who can be certain he is ordained?

As to the argument Bellarmine brings forward for the comfort of the faithful, that only *moral* and *human* certainty is possible in our state of life with regard to salvation and justification¹, that may be, of course, true enough. But it does not touch the point. It is not certainty as to salvation and justification the recipient of the Sacraments is seeking; it is certainty as to particular *means* of grace. How much of the *virtus Sacramenti* he will appropriate another question. At least he wants to be quite sure he has *the chance* of appropriating it. And the doctrine of Bellarmine and his School deprives him of this certainty always and irrevocably. To what a state, then, are the Sacraments, ordained as "effectual signs" of the gift of grace, thus reduced in their very essence by the doctrine of this School!

¹ Catharinus also deals trenchantly with this point. His phrase: "*Quis prudens dixerit Dominum Deum voluisse nos humana hujusmodi incerta certitudine torqueri?*" points to this "human" certainty being, not "moral certainty" in the proper sense of the word (see Ch. I) but in the sense of probability only and not certainty at all.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

WE have now practically come to the end of our enquiry. Before summing up our conclusions we ought, probably, to notice a hint given both by St Thomas and also by Canon Scannell, as to the possibility of a difference of treatment needed by various Sacraments. But on reflection it will appear that, *e.g.* the case of the Sacrament of Penance, which Canon Scannell instances as positing a larger share on the part of the minister in its performance, really only resolves itself into a question of greater *attention* being needed for the matter in hand. A priest can, fortunately or unfortunately, say his Mass inattentively: he cannot hear confessions with the same degree of *inattention*. He may be in doubt whether he ought to give absolution; but once he gives it, then he performs the Sacrament. Similarly, a man may have doubts as to whether he is doing right in marrying his bride or really wants to do so; and the bride may have similar doubts about her bridegroom. But once of their own free will, without impediment, and with the knowledge they ought to have about each other's circumstances, they have done "what the Church does," then

they are really married. "I don't think I ought to," or "I don't really want to," are different from "I don't intend to." Again, we ought to notice the case of *conditional* conferring of the Sacraments. Conditional baptisms are met with at least as early as the thirteenth century, *e.g.* in the decretal of Pope Alexander III on the subject¹. This, again, does not really affect our enquiry, for the intention of conferring a Sacrament if that Sacrament has not already been conferred *is expressed publicly at the time*, and so is a real intention.

We may now sum up what we have found in the course of our enquiry. We began by setting out as clearly as possible the purpose of the Sacraments, and the nature of all that pertains to them, minister, matter, and form. We then considered what an "intention" actually is, and proceeded to notice various views as to the operation of intention. In the course of our researches we remarked as we went along the various stages in the growth of the theology of the subject. We began with the age of action rather than theory, and noticed an instance of the rough and ready answer given by the Primitive Church in the case of the baptisms performed by the youthful Athanasius. This answer was based on charity and the desire to safeguard the certainty

¹ "De quibus dubium est an baptizati fuerint, baptizantur his verbis praemissis: Si baptizatus es, non te baptizo: sed si nondum baptizatus es, ego te baptizo, etc." (*Decretal.* lib. iii. tit. 42; *De Baptismo et ejus effectu*, cap. 2).

of the faithful in their Sacraments. We then went on to the questions which troubled St Augustine, and the tentative answers he gave to them. This marked the real beginning of speculation on the subject. Again charity was to be stretched as far as it could be without hurting the faithful. It stretched very far indeed, even as far as the admission of "fallacious" Sacraments. Then we came to the twelfth-century disputes between Intentionists and No-Intentionists, and noted the preoccupation of the latter with the part played by Christ Himself in the conferring of the Sacraments, a fact insisted upon by the Fathers and never to be lost sight of. Then, in the sixteenth century, we found the necessity of taking notice of the intention of the minister as an *animate* instrument, agreed on all sides. The teaching of St Thomas and the giants among the Schoolmen had had time to sink in. The further question then emerged, as to whether it sufficed to take notice of an *exterior* intention expressed in acts, in the using of proper matter and form seriously, or whether the *interior* intention of the minister, which must necessarily exist in a rational being, must also be taken into account.

It might suffice if the writer, having endeavoured to provide full materials for judgment, now left it to the reader to decide for himself. That he must do, of course, in any case: he cannot coerce the

mind of the reader, nor would he ever wish to. The fashionable thing is to profess complete detachment. The writer holds, though, that, having examined a question with some care, he ought himself to have come to some conclusion about it. And, though he has tried to state the whole case fairly, it cannot have escaped the notice of the reader that he obviously ranges himself with Catharinus and against Bellarmine and the majority of modern Roman Catholic School writers. This need not deter the reader from disagreeing with him! But, having made this confession, he may, perhaps, be allowed a final word or two in his defence. The reader's remedy would be to write another book and refute him if he can. The result would, doubtless, be to get more notice taken of the whole subject, as it should be, in our own Communion.

In the first place, then, though plants must grow, it is possible for them to over-grow and become weedy and rank. There is apt to be an over-growth in theology as in any other matter, and elaboration is not necessarily a sign of healthy growth. The writer believes that Bellarmine and his followers exhibit this tendency: they tend to over-elaboration and an excess of subtilty: they "cannot see the wood for the trees." They coincide with an age when philosophy had become rank, and was moving towards Descartes and the

modern sceptical philosophers. Their logic is too far divorced from life; they seem to be playing a game of dialectic with too much regard for its own peculiar rules and too little regard for the importance of the issues they are dealing with.

Further, Bellarmine and his School do not seem to the writer to be in the true line of succession from St Augustine and the Fathers. This is admitted by one of them, Fr Pourrat¹, who remarks: "The theologians who deem the interior intention necessary must interpret the text of ancient authors which go counter to their view. The insufficiency of their explanations let us frankly admit." We have had the opportunity of viewing Bellarmine's efforts in this direction, and even in the interpretation of a mediaeval writer like St Thomas. We have also been able to note the strained interpretations he puts upon Holy Scripture itself.

In the opinion of the writer, the middle position taken by Catharinus and his School seems to be in the true line of development from the Fathers. The reasons they adduce for their view seem to be true and straightforward reasons, far-reaching but not over-subtle. Their conspicuous merit lies in their safeguarding the faith of the simple, as the Church has always striven to do. In no part of the Church have they been condemned: in all parts, so he thinks, should they be applauded.

¹ *Theol. of Sacraments*, p. 390.

APPENDIX
CATHARINUS' TREATISE
ON INTENTION

NON est dubium apud Catharinum requiri intentionem ministri ad verum sacramentum conferendum. Sed illud dubium, *quaenam sit* ista ministri intentio quae requiritur.

Videtur enim quod non requiratur intentio ministri in hoc, ut intendat conferre sacramentum et effectum sacramenti. Haereticus qui non credit Baptismum esse sacramentum non potest habere hanc intentionem conferendi sacramentum et effectus ejus: et nihilominus, nemo negat hujuscemodi haereticos baptizare et conferre sacramenta. Et tamen e converso dici solet, et ministri tenentur habere intentionem conferendi sacramentum ad hoc ut conferant illud.

Dicendum est ergo quod intentio ministri debet esse in hoc, ut intendat facere quod Christus et Ecclesia facit, etiamsi nihil ipse credat fieri: et in hunc sensum debet intelligi id quod dicitur requiri, scilicet ut minister intendat conferre sacramentum, id est, ut faciendo quod facit Ecclesia intendat eum effectum producere qui vere producitur. Et hoc revera praestat ipse cum agit ministrum in hujuscemodi opere. Sunt enim

manifeste in Ecclesia formae sacramentorum et materia et reliquiae operantes, quas si intendat servare, certe satis se intendit esse ministrum. Nihil enim aliud requirit ab illo Ecclesia. Intentionem enim bonam ipsa servat pro cunctis filiis suis, et non exigit eam a ministro. Verum haec suboritur non negligenda quaestio. Ponemus ministrum omnia exterius facere quae jubet Ecclesia, intus enim aliud servare in anima, ita ut intendat *derisorie* baptizare. Satis-ne hoc fuerit ut completum dici possit Baptismi sacramentum? Si affirmatur, videtur falsum esse commune dictum, videlicet, quod intentio ministri requiratur. Sin enim negetur, durum nimis videtur quod Dominus Deus in arbitrio impii ministri posuerit animam et salutem hominis. At amplius, quod sacramenta quae instituit ad certificandum hominem de sua conciliatione et gratia non hunc finem attingant: quia homo de intentione ministri interna nunquam poterit esse certus, et ita semper cogetur fluctuare. Quapropter variae circa hanc rem exortae sunt opiniones. Quidam enim (ut recitat Beatus Thomas) dixerunt, etsi requiratur intentio ministri, tamen quum non adest, supplet in pueris Christus qui baptizat interius; et si fuerit adultus, supplet ejus fides atque devotio. Huic opinioni non consentit Dominus Thomas: quoniam etsi non sit negandum supplementum quo ad gratiam, non tamen venire dici potest ex vi sacramenti,

unde non supplebitur character, qui non im-
primitur nisi in sacramento re ipsa suscepto.

Ergo altera sententia, quam B. Thomas in
quarto, sed praesertim in tertia parte, loco jam
citato, probat atque confirmat, nempe hanc, satis
adesse intentionem ministri ad perficiendum
sacramentum quando servat exterius ritum Ec-
clesiae. Verba illius haec sunt: Alii dicunt quod
in Baptismo et in aliis sacramentis quae habent
in forma illum exactum, non requiritur mentalis
intentio, sed sufficit expressio intentionis per
verba ab Ecclesia instituta: et ideo si forma serva-
tur, nec aliquid exterius dicitur quod intentionem
contrariam exprimat, baptizatus est. Haec ille.
Et licet hanc opinionem ipse non ut suam reci-
taverit, sed ut quorundam, in ea tamen quieverit,
judicans prorsus indignum et inconveniens cogi
hominem esse dubium suae adeptae gratiae in
sacramento, maxime ex parte ipsius sacramenti.
Patet autem illum in ea sententia quievisse, quia
etiam in *Summa* eam tandem recitans opinionem
expressus probat, his verbis: Alii melius dicunt,
quod minister sacramenti agit in persona totius
Ecclesiae, cujus est minister. In verbis autem
quae profert, exprimitur intentio Ecclesiae quae
sufficit ad perfectionem sacramenti, nisi con-
trarium exterius exprimatur ex parte ministri.
Haec ibi. Quare miratus sum vehementer quo-
modo hanc tam claram Beati Thomae sententiam

Cajetanus nova glossa, quae vere destruit textum, tentaverit obscurare, immo etiam pervertere, volens Beatum Thomam, ubi dixit satis esse ad perfectionem Sacramenti si minister illibatam servaverit Ecclesiae formam, non intellexisse hoc satis fuisse simpliciter ad perfectionem sacramenti, sed ad perfectionem relatam ad humanam certitudinem, ac si dixerit: Satis est homini ut sit certus humana certitudine de intentione ministri, et consequenter de perfectione sacramenti, si audierit sacramentum recte ministrari.

Quod autem hoc sit primum destruere literam sancti Doctoris, non conabor persuadere: quoniam hoc puto esse evidentissimum. Nam in quarto dixit expresse et absolute quod ab hujusmodi ministro baptizatus, baptizatus est. Et in *Summa*, quod illud sufficiebat ad perfectionem sacramenti, et non dixit ad certificationem humanam, ponens ejus perfectionem non simpliciter evidentem. Nam hoc etiam falsum est, quod de intentione hominis certificemur certitudine humana, et hoc ipso quod in speciem videatur servare ritum, ita ut in re tanta valeamus quiescere et habere pro certioratis illa certitudine. Quid enim, si qui baptizat sit haereticus, aut Judaeus, aut (ut sunt plerique) omnino infidelis, et hoc aliqua vel certa vel probabili conjectura constare possit? Quis de intentione sua bona ad conferendum sacramentum faciat me certiore? Et quis prudens dixerit

Dominum Deum voluisse nos humana hujusmodi incerta certitudine torqueri, si quid tamen de nostra salute solliciti simus? At, inquit Cajetanus, si aliter B. Thomae verba interpretemur, invenietur ipsemet Sanctus Doctor sibi ipsi contrarius: quoniam in art. x. ejusdem quaestionis ubi ait: intentio ministri potest perverti dupliciter: uno modo, respectu ipsius sacramenti, puta cum aliquis non intendit sacramentum conferre, sed derisorie aliquid agere; et talis perversitas tollit veritatem sacramenti, praecipue quando suam intentionem exterius manifestat. Ex quibus verbis videtur certe accipi, quod sive manifeste hanc suam intentionem exterius, sive non manifeste, verbis tamen sacramenti utroque casu tollitur, sed praecipue si manifestet eam. Verum si ita intelligitur Sanctus Doctor, juxta rigorem verborum non potest vere sic accipi: quia si utroque casu tollitur veritas sacramenti, certe non magis in uno quam in altero, quoniam non datur magis et minus in non ente. Manifestatio enim intentionis non facit, juxta horum doctrinam, ad tollendam veritatem sacramenti, sed ipsa intentio: et sic non proprie hoc in loco in eum sensum dicitur illud "praecipue."

Verus ergo B. Thomae sensus videtur conformis ad illum quem verba ipsius faciunt in octavo illo articulo et in responsione ad secundum, ac si expresse dixerit: Si minister pervertit intentionem

in conferendo sacramentum, non confert. Et haec est vera absolute. Quoniam vero de ejus perversitate intentionis posset dubitari ex his quae gerit exterius non servans Ecclesiae ritum, B. Thomas ad id quod erat clarissimum vertit oculum, videlicet, si hanc intentionem exterius manifestat, puta ludendo aut quid simile faciendo quo clare ostendat se habere intentionem perversam, res absque dubio est. Si autem non omnino id manifestat, et potest tamen ex aliquibus conjectari, ut si quae omittat de consuetis in Ecclesia; quia non propterea dicitur manifestare intentionem perversam, et tamen exterius illud agit quod ingerit dubium de intentione, in hoc casu non habet pro certo Sanctus Doctor utrum tunc conferatur veritas sacramenti. Ideo dixit tunc *praecipue* non conferri quum exterius ministri intentio manifestatur. At si exterius nihil fiat praeter id quod fieri consuevit in Ecclesia, non dubium quin Sanctus Doctor retineat opinionem suam superius recitam, quam ego suscipio et teneo. Et si oporteret etiam fateri, B. Thomam in hoc articulo non satis constanter scripsisse, nihilominus dictum superius semper sustinerem, quod multo est aequius et conscientias reddit pacatiores; et si subtiliter expendatur, nemo valeat non probare. Non enim alia intentio ministri requiritur, nisi ut intendat exterius facere quod facit Ecclesia, quamvis ipse neque credat esse Ecclesiam, neque illum Bap-

tismi spiritualement effectum: sed satis est ut intendat facere quod Ecclesia jubet per ministros fieri. Nam quod illa per ministros facit, ipsa facere intelligitur. Quid ergo facit Ecclesia per ministros baptizando, nisi quod legitima utitur materia, adhibens suam verborum formam? Hoc igitur si facit minister, profecto illud facere intendit si sit mente sanus. Quis enim vigilans faciat aliquid quod facere non intendat? Qui ergo ex industria lavat puerum, profecto lavare intendit, et impossibile est eum non habere illam intentionem lavandi, si lavat. Sic in proposito, si Baptismi minister ea in baptizando observat quae observari praecipit Ecclesia (hoc enim patere potest ad oculum) non potest ex parte ipsius baptizantis dubitari de intentione et consequenter de collatione sacramenti. Quamobrem Beatus Johannes Chrysostomus, videns quid ab ipso requiratur ministro, sapienter dixit: Sacerdos et linguam et manum praebet. Neque enim justum est propter alius malitiam ad salutem nostram accedentes offendi. Haec ille. Et Nicolaus Papa hoc intelligens, ad consulta Bulgarorum respondet his verbis: A quodam Judaeo, nescitis utrum Christiano an pagano, multos in patria vestra baptizatos asseritis. Hi profecto, si in nomine Sanctae Trinitatis baptizati sunt, rebaptizari non debent. Vide ut nihil aliud Papa requirit a baptizante, nisi ut super legitima materia, forma etiam legitima observetur,

THE NEW YORK
LIBRARY
NEW YORK

ita ut non alia ministri intentio desideretur: ne in manu perfidorum posita sit nostra salus a Deo.

Idem est de intentione recipientis sacramentum. Nam, etsi ipse accedat ficto animo atque haeretico, non credens ullum sacramenti effectum, si tamen se subdit consuetudini Ecclesiae, et patitur de more se baptizari, recipit nihilominus sacramentum, id est, characterem licet non gratiam. Neque potest dicere: Ego non intendebar recipere characterem, cum non crederem; quia respondebitur illi, Cur igitur passus es in te fieri quae facere consuevit Ecclesia, ex quibus provenit ille effectus quem ipsa praedicavit eventurum cunctis, quovis animo ad hoc sacramentum accedentibus? Unde nec reiteraretur in his Baptismus, etiam suam praedicantibus fictionem, qua tamen recedente, ac fide adveniente absque dolo, ipse jam collatus Baptismus effectum gratiae operatur, ut recte Theologi docent. Et hanc esse doctrinam Ecclesiae planam et absque scrupulo procedentem, quam ipse quoque usus perpetuus comprobavit, non dubito: quam tamen et Apostolicae Sedis et Concilii cognitioni ac censurae ingenue subdo.

Benedictus Deus.

CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY
W. LEWIS
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

265

L263

76177

